The Logical Geometry of Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions		
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but not vice versa

"the *A* is *B*" $\exists x (Ax \land \forall y (Ay \rightarrow y = x) \land Bx)$ [the x: Ax]Bx $\exists x A x$ (EX)

 $\forall x \forall y \big((Ax \land Ay) \to x = y \big)$ (UN)

 $\forall x(Ax \to Bx)$ (UV)

[the $x: Ax] \neg Bx$ versus

ARISTOTELIAN DIAGRAMS FOR DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS

the two interpretations of "the *A* is not *B*" stand in different Aristotelian relations to "the *A* is *B*": \neg [the x: Ax] Bx is FOL-contradictory to [the x: Ax] Bx

	Boolean	hexagon of
are of opposition		opposition

bitstring semantics/partition of logical space induced by this square/hexagon:

 $\alpha_1 := [\text{the } x \colon Ax]Bx,$ $\alpha_2 := [\text{the } x : Ax] \neg Bx,$ $\alpha_3 := \neg[(\mathsf{EX}) \land (\mathsf{UN})]$





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This research is supported by a Postdoctoral Research Fellowship of the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO).